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ABSTRACT OF THESIS

UTILIZATION OF A SMALL UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEM FOR
DIRECT SAMPLING OF NITROGEN OXIDES PRODUCED BY
FULL-SCALE SURFACE MINE BLASTING

Emerging health concern for gaseous nitrogen oxides (NOx) emitted during surface mine
blasting has prompted mining authorities in the United States to pursue new regulations.
NOx is comprised of various binary compounds of nitrogen and oxygen. Nitric oxide (NO)
and nitrogen dioxide (NO2) are the most prominent. Modern explosive formulations are
not designed to produce NOx during properly-sustained detonations, and researchers have
identified several causes through laboratory experiments; however, direct sampling of NOx
following full-scale surface mine blasting has not been accomplished.
The purpose of this thesis was to demonstrate a safe, innovative method of directly
quantifying NOx concentrations in a full-scale surface mining environment. A small
unmanned aircraft system was used with a continuous gas monitor to sample concentrated
fumes. Three flights were completed – two in the Powder River Basin. Results from a
moderate NOx emission showed peak NO and NO2 concentrations of 257 ppm and 67.2
ppm, respectively. The estimated NO2 presence following a severe NOx emission was
137.3 ppm. Dispersion of the gases occurred over short distances, and novel geometric
models were developed to describe emission characteristics. Overall, the direct sampling
method was successful, and the data collected are new to the body of scientific knowledge.
KEYWORDS: Nitrogen Oxides, Explosive Gases, Surface Mine Blasting, Small
Unmanned Aircraft System, Gas Monitoring
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Chapter One: Introduction
In February of 2015, the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (OSM)
announced its intention to develop regulations limiting certain toxic gases produced during
surface mine blasting. The decision was stimulated by a petition filed in April of 2014 by
the environmental group, WildEarth Guardians (WEG). In its appeal, WEG called on OSM
to promulgate legislation prohibiting visible emissions of nitrogen oxides (NOx), arguing
that such emissions pose an immediate risk to human health and safety and universally
exceed the Environmental Protection Agency’s national ambient air quality standards –
causes relevant to the protection granted by the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation
Act of 1977 (SMCRA)1,2. WEG identified the current lack of NOx legislation as a
“regulatory gap” and petitioned for “enforceable standards” (WEG, 2014a).
Blasting is an integral part of the surface mining process. Explosive products fracture rock
with rapidly-expanding gases. The volume of gas produced during a blast is typically 1,000
times that of the original explosives product (QG, 2011). Various non-ideal circumstances
can degrade an explosive reaction and form unintended, toxic byproducts. Nitrogen-based
explosives (particularly ANFO) have the potential to generate NOx when an imperfect
explosive reaction occurs. Of the various nitrogen oxides, nitric oxide (NO) and nitrogen
dioxide (NO2) are the most prevalent and hazardous in the blasting context. NO2 is of
greater toxicity than NO and is a skin, eye, and lung irritant. Concentrated doses can lead
to illness or death, though the relevant histories of such events in the mining and

1

Section 102(a) describes one of SMCRA’s goals as “protecting society and the environment from the
adverse effects of surface coal mining operations” (95 th Congress, 1977).
2
Section 515(b)(15)(C)(i)-(ii) states that blasting activities should be limited in order to “prevent injury to
persons [and] damage to public and private property outside the permit area” (95th Congress, 1977).

1

commercial explosives industries are small. Most accidents resulting from blasting
emissions have been caused by carbon monoxide (CO), which can become a health issue
following confined blasting – if the gas migrates through strata to nearby surface structures.
Gases produced during surface blasting are typically concentrated in a “cloud” or “fume.”
Dispersion of a cloud usually occurs within a short time, as the prevailing wind transports
it from the blast site; however, it is possible for clouds to be (1) contained within the blast
site if the explosives are detonated in a confined area (such as a pit) or (2) carried across
the permit boundary if the blast occurs near the boundary or is of considerable scale.
Currently, the NOx concentration present in blast-generated clouds is understood
qualitatively by cloud coloration – yellow, orange, red, and brown. There have been few
attempts to acquire direct, physical measurements from blast-generated clouds to represent
the various observed colors. Risk of exposure to concentrated, harmful gases (such as
NOx), heavy dust, and distance to the shot (typically >1,000 feet for safety from fly
material) limit effective gas sampling options.
The purpose of this project is to demonstrate a safe, innovative method of directly
quantifying NOx concentrations generated by full-scale surface mine blasting. A small
unmanned aircraft system (sUAS) and continuous gas monitor are used to collect
measurements. Experimental results contribute to the body of knowledge regarding blastgenerated NOx, advance the scientific understanding of blasting’s immediate impact on the
local atmosphere, and offer objective insight into the extent of human health risk.

Copyright © Robert Brendan McCray 2016
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Chapter Two: Review of Literature
2.1 Assessment of Blast-generated NOx
Previous studies evaluating explosive-generated NOx have primarily been conducted in
isolated blasting chambers or controlled-volume facilities. Experiments by Chaiken et al.
(1974), Mainiero (1997), Rowland and Mainiero (2000), Rowland et al. (2001), and Sapko
et al. (2002) measured the small-scale NOx output of the most widely-used explosives
products, including ANFO, emulsion, and ANFO/emulsion blends. These same
experiments evaluated some of the potential sources of NOx, discussed in Section 2.2.
Few studies have attempted to measure NOx following full-scale surface mine blasting,
primarily due to practical difficulties involved with prediction of the cloud path and
retrieval of representative samples. Attalla et al. (2008) published a paper describing an
indirect method quantifying NOx inside of blast-generated clouds using ultraviolet
spectrometry. The data were supplemented by ground-level gas monitor readings collected
downwind. The evaluation focused on NO2 and concluded that the gas was present in
observed clouds between 0 and 7 ppm, with a maximum recorded value of 17 ppm.
At this time, there are no physical data available that can adequately quantify the
instantaneous peak NOx concentrations within blast-generated clouds. For this reason, NOx
presence is visually classified in a qualitative manner. It is generally accepted that low NOx
concentrations are associated with pale yellow, high with dark red or purple, and
intermediate with various intensities of orange (WEG, 2014a; QG, 2011; and AEISG,
2011). The color of the cloud is the result of NO2 alone. According to the Queensland State
Government, 2.5 ppm NO2 is the minimum visible concentration (WEG, 2014b). The
3

Australian Explosives Industry and Safety Group Inc. (AEISG) has developed a
standardized, qualitative color chart for describing blast-generated NOx (Figure 2.1). The
chart is one of few published NOx management techniques in the mining and commercial
explosives industries.
Fume Level
Level 0
No NOx gas
Level 1
Slight NOx gas
Level 2
Minor yellow/orange gas
Level 3
Orange gas
Level 4
Orange/red gas
Level 5
Red/purple gases

Color

Pantone Number
Warm Grey 1C
(RGB 244, 222, 217)
Pantone 155C
(RGB 244, 219, 170)
Pantone 157C
(RGB 237, 160, 79)
Pantone 158C
(RGB 232, 117, 17)
Pantone 1525C
(RGB 181, 84, 0)
Pantone 161C
(RGB 99, 58, 17)

Figure 2.1: Sample Standardized Color Chart (AEISG, 2011)
Figure 2.2 provides a visual reference to levels one through five of the AEISG color chart.
The letter code assigned to a particular fume level in Figure 2.2 refers to the extent of NOx
produced across the blasting pattern. Localized refers to only a few blast holes, Medium
refers to 50% of the holes, and extensive indicates that all blast holes are responsible for
the emission (AEISG, 2011).

4

Figure 2.2: Sample Fume Reference (AEISG, 2011)

5

2.2 Sources of NOx
Potential sources of NOx have been identified through laboratory studies. The following
list represents a thorough (but not necessarily comprehensive) collection of factors that
affect an explosive’s performance (QG, 2011):
1) Manufacture and specification of explosive ingredients
2) Explosive mixture (e.g. under-fueled ANFO)
3) Density of loaded explosives
4) Degree of confinement
5) Water damage
6) Ground conditions (cracks, voids, etc.) that affect planned loading practices
7) Borehole loading practices
ANFO is most commonly associated with NOx production, though past experiments have
explored the relationships between ANFO, emulsion, and various blends of the two agents.
Early work by Chaiken et al. (1974) tested ANFO mixtures within the Bureau of Mines
closed gallery facility. Findings showed that under-fueled ANFO produced increased
volumes of NOx. Later work by Mainiero (1997) and Rowland and Maniero (2000)
monitored the detonation of various mixtures of ANFO in the National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health’s Pittsburgh Research Laboratory. Results indicated that a
mixture of 94% ammonium nitrate and 6% fuel oil was close to optimum for minimizing
the volume of NOx generated. Figure 2.3 displays relevant data collected by Rowland and
Mainiero (2000) and demonstrates the trend in NOx and NO2 by fuel oil content.

6

Figure 2.3: Effect of ANFO Fuel Oil % on NOx (Rowland and Mainiero, 2000)
Rowland and Mainiero (2000) also evaluated the effect of water content (i.e. water damage)
on NOx generation. Figure 2.4 identifies a generally-increasing trend in NOx production as
ANFO (6% fuel oil) is exposed to larger concentrations of water.

Figure 2.4: Effect of ANFO Water Content on NOx (Rowland and Mainiero, 2000)

7

Other notable findings by Rowland and Mainiero (2000) included testing of aluminum and
rock dust additives in 6% fuel oil ANFO mixtures. The presence of aluminum did not
increase NOx emissions; however, rock dust did. The results indicated that that drill cutting
contamination in explosives (i.e. rock dust) influenced the quality of detonation.
Rowland et al. (2001) assessed the NOx production of emulsion and ANFO/emulsion
blends at the Pittsburg Research Laboratory. The authors specifically examined the effect
of relative confinement, using schedule 80 steel pipe and galvanized sheet metal pipe. In
addition, samples were exposed to various intervals of water exposure to explore
degradation of explosive mixtures over time. The water component of the experiment was
tuned to address conclusions presented by Schettler and Brasher (1996), which stated that
an ANFO/emulsion blend was only water-resistant with 40% or greater emulsion content
and water-proof with at least 50% emulsion. Results presented by Rowland et al. (2001)
agreed with the previous evidence, showing that water introduced to a 70/30
ANFO/emulsion blend for one day prevented detonation and any water exposure of the
blend within the galvanized sheet metal pipe completely inhibited detonation. Furthermore,
the 50/50 blends were water resistant for short-term exposures up to one week. Pure
emulsion detonated even after two months. It was noted that, while there was no substantial
deviance in detonation velocity, and the physical appearance of the agent appeared normal
after two months, NOx production was higher than anticipated.
Sapko et al. (2002) conducted a series of controlled tests designed to evaluate ANFO
particle size, inexpensive additives, relative confinement, critical diameter, water
stemming, oil wicking, and detonation within an air-displaced atmosphere. The authors
compared NOx volumes generated by ANFO, emulsion, and a 50/50 blend in the Pittsburg
8

Research Laboratory. Findings showed that lower relative confinement, fuel oil wicking
by dry/soft/porous soil during extended sleep times (especially in small boreholes), ANFO
water damage, and drill cutting contamination in emulsion increased NOx. In addition, the
various additives (urea, coal dust, aluminum powder, excess fuel oil) reduced NOx.
The laboratory testing previously described is organized by author in Table 2.1. It lists the
lowest and highest volumes generated per kilogram of blasting agent. If no range was
provided by a particular author, point estimates are listed (Chaiken et al., 1974 and EPA,
1980). The concept for this tabular organization was derived from a report published by
Lashgari et al. (2013), which evaluated mine-wide environmental NOx emissions from
equipment and blasting.
Table 2.1: Laboratory Testing, Volume of NOx per Kilogram of Blasting Agent
NOx
(L/kg)
Chaiken et al. (1974)
ANFO Under fueled
7.0
Environmental Protection Agency ANFO 1980 Published Estimate
5.8
Low, 94/6 product
2.5
Mainiero (1997)
ANFO
High, under fueled
4.8
Low, 0% Water, 94/6
2.0
Rowland and Mainiero (2000)
ANFO
High, under fueled, 99/1
9.9
Low, no water
2.7
Emulsion
High, one week water
6.5
Rowland et al. (2001)
Low, steel pipe, one week water
5.0
50/50
High, steel pipe, one month water 11.8
Low, steel pipe confinement
11.0
ANFO
High, galv. steel pipe confinement 36.5
Low, steel pipe confinement
4.2
Sapko et al. (2002)
Emulsion
High, drill cuttings contamination
6.2
Low, steel pipe confinement
19.6
50/50
High, galv. steel pipe confinement 31.0
AUTHOR

AGENT
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CONDITION

Figure 2.4 provides an improved graphical representation of the various ranges and point
estimates presented in Table 2.1.

Figure 2.4: Relevant Estimates of Blast-generated NOx
Based on existing research, it is clear from Figure 2.4 that ANFO and 50/50
ANFO/emulsion blends are expected to generate elevated volumes of NOx compared to
pure emulsion. Emulsion naturally has water resistance by its composition, providing some
explanation for the narrow range of NOx generated per kilogram of the explosive. In
addition, Sapko et al. (2002) suggested that another specification of emulsion is also
influential. Specifically, the difference in grain size between ANFO and emulsion.
According the authors, Ammonium nitrate prills in ANFO are relatively large.
Alternatively, the nitrate component of emulsion is in solution, allowing for enhanced
contact with the emulsified fuel. The detonation of emulsion therefore facilitates immediate
reactions of NOx with hydrocarbons, generating more nitrogen and water instead of NO.

10

2.3 Evaluating Cloud Dispersion
Cloud Dispersion is the natural dilution of toxic gaseous components to safe or ambient
atmospheric concentrations. NOx generated by surface blasting typically disperses in
seconds to minutes, depending on the scale of emissions, local atmospheric conditions, and
initial toxicity of the cloud (Sapko et al, 2002; AEISG, 2011; and QG, 2011). The cloud
dispersion rate directly affects human health and safety, since concentrations of NO and/or
NO2 may remain sufficiently high for a short period after a blast to harm individuals in the
cloud path (AEISG, 2011). There are few examples of formal cloud dispersion analyses,
but those available have applied computer-based dispersion modeling techniques.
Attalla et al. (2008) utilized AFTOX to evaluate whether concentrations of NO2 from
observed blasting emissions were unhealthy at five kilometers downwind. The findings
suggested that NO2 levels at this distance and beyond “may be indistinguishable from
background levels; typically of the order of several parts per billion, in most cases” (Attalla
et al., 2008). AFTOX is a toxic chemical dispersion model developed by the United Stated
Air Force. It is a Gaussian dispersion model designed for continuous or instantaneous
emissions of liquids or gas from a single location (plume emissions). AFTOX can be used
to calculate a toxic corridor (hazardous concentration by distance from the source), the
concentration at a specific location, or the maximum concentration and its associated
location (Kunkel, 1991 and Dungey, 1993).
The Queensland Government in Australia (QG, 2011) developed a human exclusion zone
as a guide to protect individuals from NO2 concentrations above 5.0 ppm. The exclusion
zone was defined using SLAB modelling software. SLAB is an atmospheric dispersion

11

model for denser-than-air plume releases, such as blast-generated NO2. It calculates
dispersion by solving for conservation of mass, momentum, energy, and species. The
model was developed at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (Ermak, 1990).
Table 2.2 is a reconstruction of the human exclusion table produced by QG (2011).
Exclusion distances downwind and crosswind from blasting are derived from the fume
level (i.e. a specific initial NO2 concentration) and local atmospheric wind conditions.
Table 2.2: Guide for Human Exclusion Distance from Blasting (QG, 2011)

Downwind Exclusion Distance (m) Required to Maintain NO2
Below 5.0 ppm
Fume
Initial
A
Category
NO2 (very unstable)
(subjective
(ppm) High Temp,
ranking)
Windy

Stability Class and Wind Speed
B
(unstable)

C
(slightly
unstable)

D
(neutral)

Potential
Crosswind
Extent of 0.12 Exclusion Distance
ppm (m) (odor (m) (from blast
threshold)
cloud center line)

Wind Speed
Wind Speed Wind Speed Wind Speed
6.8 - 12.6 kmph 2.9 - 10 kmph 1.4 - 4.32 kmph 1.4 - 2.2 kmph
(4.2 - 7.8 mph) (1.8 - 6.2 mph) (0.9 - 2.7 mph) (0.9 - 1.4 mph)
0
1
2
3
4
5

2
4
7
17
70
500

100
130
400
600
900
1,600

100
140
500
1,000
1,600
3,000

100
150
500
1,200
3,000
5,000

100
150
500
1,200
3,000
5,000

1,200
3,000
4,000
8,000
13,000
20,000

100
150
500
1,000
1,500
2,000

Table 2.2 is one of few published dispersion tools and is burdened by limited data and a
number of critical assumptions, including the following (QG, 2011):
1. Initial clouds are universally 100 meters by 100 meters in size and extend from the
ground vertically to 150 meters.
2. The surface roughness applied in the model is 0.05 meters, representative of a
grassland landscape
3. Up to five times NO2 may appear through oxidation of NO to NO2 during
dispersion.

12

Assumption three is a major uncertainty. Oxidation of NO to NO2 occurs naturally in air,
since NO is unstable in the presence of oxygen and moisture (Wieland 1998 and Onederra
2012). Oxidation occurs through the following chemical reaction:
2𝑁𝑂 + 𝑂2 → 2𝑁𝑂2

(1)

The rate of oxidation depends on the initial NO concentration and time (Sapko et al., 2002).
Mainiero et al. (2006) examined the kinetics of oxidation for NO as a gaseous detonation
product, finding a consistent rate constant for concentrations of NO up to 100 ppm
(Mainiero et al., 2006). As a result of oxidation, the immediate, post-blast NO2
concentration may be the largest measurable, but more of the gas will form as the cloud is
in transit and dispersing.
In addition to Attalla et al. (2008) and QG (2011), The United States Bureau of Land
Management (BLM, 2010) referenced an unspecified NOx modelling method in its
comprehensive environmental impact statement for the Wright, Wyoming area coal lease
applications. According to the publication, air quality permit applications submitted by the
Black Thunder, Jacobs Ranch, and North Antelope Rochelle mines were evaluated, in order
to assess the worst-case annual NOx emissions (blasting and other sources). The indirect
modelling analysis by the BLM found that “impacts from the worst case years fall well
below the annual NO2 NAAQS of 100 µg/m3” (BLM, 2010). NAAQS refers to the National
Ambient Air Quality Standards, set forth by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA,
2011). The secondary standard requires an average atmospheric NO2 concentration of at
most 53 ppb over one year, as codified in 40 CFR 50.11 (see Section 2.5 for further
information).
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2.4 Relevant Occupational Health Standards and Epidemiology of NO2
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), American Conference of
Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH), and National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health (NIOSH) have published standards regarding human exposure to NO
and NO2. Table 2.3 displays the current OSHA regulatory exposure limits, in addition to
those suggested by ACGIH and NIOSH (OSHA, n.d.; ACGIH, 2012; NIOSH, 1995).
Table 2.3: Toxicity Measures of NO2, NO, and CO
SUBSTANCE
Nitrogen Dioxide
Nitric Oxide
Carbon Monoxide

OSHA REGULATORY PEL(A) ACGIH TLV(B)
5 ppm Ceiling
0.2 ppm TWA
25 ppm TWA
25 ppm TWA

NIOSH REL(C)
NIOSH IDLH(D)
1 ppm STEL
20 ppm
25 ppm TWA
100 ppm
35 ppm TWA;
25 ppm TWA
1,200 ppm
200 ppm Ceiling

50 ppm TWA

PEL: Permissible exposure limit – defined as either (1) an 8-hour time-weighted average, (2) a 15 minute short term exposure
limit, or (3) a ceiling exposure concentration
(B)
TLV: Threshold limit value – see PEL
(C)
REL: Recommended exposure limit – see PEL
(D)
IDLH: Immediately dangerous to life or health concentration
(A)

NO2 is a more prominent health concern than NO, as demonstrated by Table 2.3. NO2 is a
corrosive, reactive gas that has a strong odor. According to NIOSH (1979), symptoms of
acute exposure vary, based on the duration and concentration. Minor exposures can result
in irritation of the skin, eyes, and nose, in addition to coughing, shortness of breath, and
headaches. Exposure for extended time periods or to elevated concentrations can cause
pulmonary edema, a severe and often fatal outcome that congests the lungs with fluid. The
exact duration and/or concentration of NO2 that produce pulmonary edema are not defined,
but it is known that a latency period of 3 to 30 hours exists between initial exposure and
onset of symptoms.
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OSHA derived its regulatory ceiling limit of 5 ppm from the findings of several
epidemiologic studies that assessed human exposure to NO2. Douglas et al. (1989)
examined the medical outcomes of 17 patients exposed to silo gas (NO2 generated during
natural fermentation of chopped forages) between 1955 and 1987. Of the study group, 11
suffered from acute lung injury, one of whom perished from pulmonary edema. Helleday
et al. (1995) assessed the mucociliary activity of 24 healthy individuals in vivo. The
subjects were divided into three groups and exposed to either 1.5 ppm NO2 for 20 minutes,
3.5 ppm NO2 for 20 minutes, or 3.5 ppm NO2 for four hours. The authors concluded that
“short-term exposure to NO2 in man produces a significant reduction in the mucociliary
activity 45 [minutes] after exposure,” ceasing within 24 hours. Linaker et al. (2000)
evaluated the relationship between NO2 exposure in asthmatic children and postrespiratory-infection airway constriction. Results demonstrated that relatively low
concentrations of NO2 increased the risk of asthmatic exacerbation after respiratory
infection. Frampton et al. (2002) studied the cause-effect relationship between exposure to
NO2 and respiratory health. A total of 21 healthy patients were subjected to a range of 0.6
to 1.5 ppm NO2 for three hours with some exercise. In vitro testing of cells collected via
phlebotomy and bronchoscopy revealed a weakened immunity of epithelial cells to
respiratory viruses.
NIOSH developed its recommended exposure limit for NO2 based on an extensive case
history of environmental data and epidemiological analyses. Smith (1976) described the
criteria relative to the development of the NIOSH standard, which was designed for a 10hour workday, a 40-hour workweek, and the lifetime of an employee. The report included
relevant examples of occupational exposure, animal experimentation, and a small number
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human studies that evaluated only low concentrations of NO2. It also addressed acute and
chronic exposure to NO2 and provided some discussion of continuous versus intermittent
exposure. The findings correlating exposure and effect stated that “the acute and usually
delayed effects of higher concentrations of nitrogen dioxide on man are well established.”
Eight human case histories demonstrated evidence of delayed onset of pulmonary edema.
Several of the afflicted individuals also experienced relapse after recovering from the initial
pulmonary edema. Relapse was attributed to bronchiolitis fibrosa obliterans, a pathologic
legion of the lung. Conditions relevant to acute pulmonary edema and bronchiolitis fibrosa
obliterans were described in the context of the relative NO2 concentration at exposure:
[Pulmonary edema and associated relapse events] have not been reported at
relatively steady low levels of exposure associated with those few industrial
processes in which oxides of nitrogen are steadily generated and get into the
workplace atmosphere. All reported cases have arisen as a result of sudden or
intermittent emission of oxides of nitrogen from an accidental event such as an
explosion or combustion of nitroexplosives, the accidental escape or spilling of
concentrated nitric acid, the intermittent process of arc or gas welding, especially
in a confined space, or the imprudent entry into an agricultural silo which was not
ventilated. (Smith, 1976)
It was observed by NIOSH that the “characteristic delay” between initial exposure and
onset of pulmonary edema was 12 hours (Smith, 1976).
Though not referenced by OSHA or NIOSH, a more recent study published by Hesterberg
et al. (2009) examined fifty experimental studies of short-term human inhalation of NO2.
The authors did not determine a consistent trend in changing lung function or bronchial
sensitivity with increasing NO2 concentrations. It was concluded that “a health-protective,
short-term NO2 guideline level for susceptible (and healthy) populations would reflect a
policy choice between 0.2 and 0.6 ppm” (Hesterberg et al., 2009).
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2.5 Relevant Air Quality Standards
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulates atmospheric NO2 under the Clean
Air Act, along with four other air pollutants: ground-level ozone, particulate matter, carbon
monoxide, and sulfur dioxide (40 CFR § 50-97, 2010). The annual arithmetic average
concentration of NO2 must not exceed 53 ppb. A revision in 2010 included a 1-hour shortterm arithmetic average restriction of 100 ppb NO2 (40 CFR § 50.11, 2010). These limits
are referred to as national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS). NAAQS values are
designed to combat adverse human health effects of the specified pollutants (EPA, 2011).
The EPA has developed an air quality index (AQI) as a standardized method of reporting
polluted atmospheres and identifying sensitive groups. Larger index values indicate a
greater health concern. AQI values of 100 are intended to match the NAAQS. Table 2.4
shows the NO2 AQI, including cautionary statements (EPA 2006 and EPA 2011).
Table 2.4: Air Quality Index for Atmospheric NO2 (EPA, 2006 and EPA, 2011)

0 - 50

1-Hour NO2
Average (ppb)
0 - 53

51 - 100

54 - 100

101 - 150

101 - 360

151 - 200

361 - 649

201 - 300

650 - 1,244

> 301

> 1,245

AQI Range

AIR QUALITY

CAUTIONARY STATEMENT

Good

None
Unusually sensitive people should consider reducing prolonged
Moderate
or heavy outdoor exertion.
Unhealthy for Active children, the elderly, and people with lung disease, such
Sensitive Groups as asthma, should reduce prolonged or heavy outdoor exertion.
Active children, the elderly, and people with lung disease, such
as asthma, should avoid prolonged or heavy outdoor exertion;
Unhealthy
everyone else, especially children, should reduce prolonged or
heavy outdoor exertion.
Active children, the elderly, and people with lung disease, such
as asthma, should avoid all outdoor exertion; everyone else,
Very Unhealthy
especially children, should avoid prolonged or heavy outdoor
exertion.
Children, the elderly, and people with lung disease, such as
Hazardous
asthma, should remain indoors; everyone else, especially
children, should avoid outdoor exertion.

17

The short-term NAAQS for NO2 is relevant to surface blasting, since clouds have been
observed propagating beyond permit boundaries in some instances (Sapko et al., 2002;
BLM, 2010). There are few studies that have directly compared the impact of blastgenerated NOx with public air quality. A thorough search produced only one example.
Battelle (2012) prepared an extensive report for the West Virginia Department of
Environmental Protection that demonstrated continuous and passive sampling of air
pollutants (including NO2) in a community neighboring two active surface coal mines.
EPA-accepted sampling techniques were applied, in order to evaluate the impact of mine
blasting on local air quality. Analysis of readings collected during a two-week period
produced the following conclusion: “The overall finding of this study thus is that the local
air quality is well within applicable health-based standards and does not appear to be
affected by emissions from nearby blasting events in surface coal mining” (Battelle, 2012).
2.6 History of Casualties Caused by Blast-generated Gases
Carbon monoxide has been proven to be responsible for the overwhelming majority of
injuries caused by gases generated during surface blasting. An extensive literature base has
been dedicated to the dangers of carbon monoxide in the mine blasting context.
Researchers have discovered that confined blasting (esp. trench blasting) can suppress the
release of gases into the atmosphere, causing gases to migrate through cracks, joints, and
other geologic discontinuities (Eltschlager et al., 2001; Santis, 2001; Santis, 2003; Harris
et al., 2004; Harris et al., 2005). Between 1988 and 2005, there were 13 documented cases
of carbon monoxide propagation through strata into nearby structures (Harris et al., 2005).
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Casualties of blast-generated NOx have primarily occurred in underground mining.
Wieland (1998) reported anecdotally on the dangerous nature of NO2, stating: “typical of
circumstances was a workman who inhaled dynamite fumes for some time, felt well during
the working day, noticing no ill effects that night, only to die the next day of pulmonary
edema.” Kennedy (1972) studied 100 underground coal miners over 10 years, all of whom
had exposure to “nitrous fumes” from conventional blasting techniques. The author
discovered that low exposures over months to years produced an “emphysema-like” health
condition, and short-duration exposures to high concentrations caused an acute chest illness
with a generally full recovery. Many of the miners experienced pulmonary edema at some
point. Peak NO2 concentrations were measured at 88 ppm and 167 ppm during regular
blasting and misfires, respectively (Kennedy, 1972).
Attention has recently shifted to NOx generated during surface blasting, though there are
few examples of public or mine personnel requiring medical attention because of contact
with the gases. OSM documented instances of public exposure to NOx from Arch Coal’s
Black Thunder Coal Mine in the Powder River Basin prior to 2001, which resulted in
special control measures when large overburden shots are planned (BLM, 2010). Mining
authorities in Australia reported in 2011 that a two-week period of blasting in intensely
saturated ground resulted in the formation of four major clouds. Two clouds forced a total
of twenty four surface miners to report to a hospital for NOx exposure (Madden, 2011). A
thorough examination of literature revealed only one surface mine blasting fatality to be
the direct result of post-blast NO2 exposure. The event occurred in the Philippines in 2006.
According to the Queensland Department of Natural Resources and Mines, a blaster was
conducting a post-blast inspection at a quarry and fell into a void eight meters deep.
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Hospital staff treated him for minor injuries, but his trouble breathing was not properly
addressed. The next day, he succumbed to severe pulmonary edema (Madden, 2011).
Beyond these examples, blast-generated NOx is an obscure health and safety influence in
the surface mining context.
WEG expressed the latest concern for NOx generated during surface blasting, in its petition
to OSM. The organization’s inquiry was primarily directed at cast blasting operations, such
as those in the Powder River Basin region of the United States (WEG, 2014a). Cast blasting
at surface coal mines in the Powder River Basin sometimes detonates up to two million
pounds of blasting agent in a single event (Sapko et al., 2002 and Mainiero et al., 2006).
The existing body of knowledge regarding blast-generated NOx must be expanded, in order
to bridge the current knowledge gap and address unanswered questions regarding the initial
toxicity of large NOx clouds and the nature of their dispersion.

Copyright © Robert Brendan McCray 2016
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Chapter Three: Summary of Proposed Concept
Direct sampling during the formation and dispersion of blast-generated NOx clouds has
historically been considered impractical, due to the inherently violent and hazardous nature
of mine blasting. Post-blast conditions at mine sites are unsafe because of gas and dust
contaminants in the local atmosphere, elevated bench heights, and disturbed geologic
environments. Blasters and observers typically also recognize an observation distance of
1,000 feet, as a rule of thumb to remain safe from fly material. The application of small
unmanned aircraft system (sUAS) technology is capable of overcoming perceived safety
and accessibility challenges.
The primary value of deploying an sUAS is safety. Most modern radio controllers for sUAS
permit flight distances up to one mile. For this reason, operators, assistants, and other
observers should face no exposure to potentially-harmful, post-blast conditions, and flights
can be conducted from a pre-determined location. Safety risks generated by sUAS
operations are limited almost exclusively to personnel injury during landing and takeoff;
however, such events are preventable with proper standard operating procedures. The
sparse mine setting provides an ideal flight location for remote operated aircraft.
Rotorcraft sUAS are specifically capable of facilitating accessibility to NOx clouds during
both formation and dispersion. Many rotorcraft can achieve speeds between 20 and 45
miles per hour. As a result, intercepting a cloud is possible within seconds. The machines
can be repositioned dynamically and, through GPS guidance, are capable of hovering at a
stationary location. Unique flight modes also provide control options that are not available
with fixed-wing sUAS. Flight modes are described in Sections 4.2, 4.3, and 5.2.
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Overall, remote operation of rotorcraft sUAS offers an efficient method of evaluating (1)
the immediate impact of surface mine blasting on the local atmosphere, (2) the dissipation
of blast-generated clouds, and (3) oxidation of NO to NO2 in a full-scale mining
environment. The purpose of the following sections is to establish this novel sampling
method and demonstrate practical results.

Copyright © Robert Brendan McCray 2016
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Chapter Four: Powder River Basin Sampling
4.1 Overview
Two flights were completed in the Powder River Basin. These flights are referred to as
Flight A and Flight B and are summarized below:


Flight A occurred at the Black Thunder Coal Mine, operated by Arch Coal. The
designated takeoff and landing location was approximately 2,000 feet from the
blast. The challenge of depth perception in the large open space, in addition to poor
weather conditions (rain with wind gusts exceeding 20 miles per hour), did not
allow the S1000+ to come into contact with the blast-generated cloud. It is believed
that NOx was present in one area of the cloud, but no useful data was collected.



Flight B occurred at the Coal Creek Mine, operated by Arch Coal. The designated
takeoff and landing location was about 1,000 feet from the nearest row of holes.
The shot was an overburden blast (not a cast panel), containing approximately
330,432 pounds of explosives. Informative data regarding instantaneous
concentrations of NO, NO2, and CO was collected successfully.

Section 4.2 describes the instrumentation used to capture gas readings, along with relevant
technical specifications. Section 4.3 describes the individual methodologies applied in the
field during both Flight A and Flight B, including pre-blast decision-making and in-flight
sampling strategy. Section 4.4 illustrates the gas sample collected during Flight B.
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The established qualitative color scale interpretation of NOx (Figure 2.2) is used to assign
fume levels to the observed blast-generated clouds. The fume level classifications are
intended to supplement gas monitor readings by addressing the suspected intensity of NOx
that is assumed from a purely visual observation.
4.2 Instrumentation
The sUAS deployed during testing was a DJI S1000+, manufactured by DJI Innovations.
The S1000+ is a rotorcraft, with eight motors arranged in a circular pattern. The motors are
positioned at the end of foldable arms. The full diameter of the machine is four feet, when
the arms are raised and locked into position. Figure 4.1 shows the sUAS carbon fiber frame
without any of the flight electronics, battery, or attachments.

Figure 4.1: S1000+ (1) Collapsed and (2) Ready for Operation (DJI Innovations)
The S1000+ was selected because of its flight capabilities and weight capacity. Preprogrammed flight modes permit either rectangular navigation or radial turning about the
takeoff location. It is able to cover a large area quickly, achieving a maximum horizontal
speed of 45 miles per hour. The flight system can be operated manually via radio controller,
or a predetermined flight path can be uploaded and traversed autonomously with precision.
In large open spaces, the flight controller self-corrects in response to adverse conditions,
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such as variable wind speed and direction (recommended maximum of 20 mph). The
S1000+ can function properly with an all-inclusive takeoff weight of 24 pounds.
Figure 4.2 shows the experimental S1000+ and its necessary flight electronics. Rotor
blades and the antenna are collapsed in the image.

Figure 4.2: DJI S1000+ Equipped with Flight Electronics
Major components of the S1000+ were assembled by third-party sUAS professionals.
Sensitive electronic components were fastened further using adhesive Velcro strips. A
Zenmuse H4-3D gimbal with three axes of stabilization was also installed below the battery
tray, as displayed in Figure 4.3.
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Figure 4.3: Battery Tray With Gimbal Attachment Below
A GoPro Hero4 camera was bound to the gimbal. 4K resolution was used exclusively
during experimentation to capture the highest-resolution video possible. The camera was
charged during flight by built-in electronics, and a live video feed was provided to a video
monitor attached to the radio controller, displayed in Figure 4.4.

Figure 4.4: Futaba 14SGA, 2.4 GHz Radio Controller and Video Monitor Attachment
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The selected Futaba controller is rated for flight operations up to one mile. Basic features
of the radio controller include the two flight mode options, a failsafe switch, and a flight
timer. The video monitor provides telemetry and a measured voltage output of the battery.
During test flights, the live video feed supplemented line of sight operations within a short
distance, but consistent signal loss was experienced beyond about 500 feet. A second video
link antenna was installed on the video monitor, in order to improve signal quality. The
video link functioned reasonably well up to about 1,250 feet with the additional, more
receptive antenna.
During all operations, the flight timer was set at 16 minutes - a value determined based on
the expected battery life. A 22,000 milliamp-hour, Tattu lithium-polymer battery (22.2
Volts, 25C, 6S) was used as a power source. The battery was purchased specifically for its
AS150 connectors, which are designed for use with the S1000+. It weighs 5.53 pounds and
is rated for over 20 minutes of flight time by its manufacturer. The timer was reduced below
the rated time to compensate for the added weight of the gas monitor and the large
operational area. The S1000+ was landed before the timer ended, if the battery dropped
below 20.7 Volts when the machine was not under load.
The failsafe feature was used effectively as an auto-land feature during test flights but was
not used during NOx sampling. The failsafe was considered as an emergency safety option
at the mine sites. It was only to be used in the event that the operator lost sight with the
S1000+ for an extended period of time, or if adverse conditions required an immediate
landing. An auto failsafe also came pre-programmed into the S1000+, so that the machine
would return in the event of a lost link with the radio controller.
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The gas monitor attachment selected for use was Industrial Scientific’s iBrid MX6
aspirator model. The MX6 is a complex sampling tool that is relatively simple to operate.
It is a continuous gas monitor that draws in gas at a nominal rate of 0.3 liters per minute.
Pump speed is automatically adjusted by the device, based on inflow resistance. Figure 4.5
shows the MX6. The aspirator inlet protrudes from the upper left corner.

Figure 4.5: iBrid MX6 Gas Monitor, Aspirator Model (Industrial Scientific)
Up to five sensors can function simultaneously, providing a comprehensive view of the
local atmosphere. Table 4.1 lists the sensors that were installed during sampling.
Table 4.1: Sensors Installed During Sampling
SENSOR
Oxygen (O2)
Carbon Dioxide (CO2)
Carbon Monoxide (CO)
Nitrogen Dioxide (NO2)
Nitric Oxide (NO)

MEASUREMENT RANGE RESOLUTION SENSOR TYPE
0 - 30% Vol
0.1%
Electrochemical
0 - 5% Vol
0 - 1,500 ppm
0 - 150 ppm
1 - 1,000 ppm
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0.01%
1.0
0.1
1.0

Infrared
Electrochemical
Electrochemical
Electrochemical

The MX6 is equipped with a data logger, which evaluates gas readings at a user-specified
sampling interval and stores the information within internal memory. Data logger entries
include various parameters, such as the gas reading, STEL, TWA, a time stamp, and alarm
conditions flagged. Throughout this experiment, the interval was set at one second, in order
to capture immediate changes in gas concentrations.
Industrial Scientific considers the MX6 to be a lifesaving device. As such, calibration is
recommended monthly and bump tests are suggested before each use. A bump test is a
controlled procedure where each sensor’s target gas is introduced at a concentration just
high enough to activate the alarm. Bump tests are intended to verify the correct response
of the device before use, so that hazardous atmospheres are properly identified to the user.
Calibration of the MX6 was completed by Industrial Scientific within seventeen days of
sampling. The NO sensor was also replaced. Bump tests were not performed in the field
for two reasons. First and foremost, bump tests are important when an individual must rely
on the gas monitor for protection. Since no human exposure to harmful atmospheres
occurred during testing, bump tests were not viewed as a necessity. Secondly, three tanks
of specific gas mixtures were required for bump testing. Two of these tanks were not in
stock, and transporting the tanks cross-country would have required excessive effort.
The MX6 aspirator model was chosen specifically to avoid rotor downwash during flight.
The S1000+ generates violent thrust, even when hovering. As a result, air from above is
forced downward, potentially diluting NO2, which is heavier than air and is initially
expected to be present in larger concentrations lower to the ground. The aspirator can be
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used with tubing in order to draw an air sample from an alternate location. Overcoming
some influence of downwash was possible by suspending tubing below the S1000+.
Up to 100 feet of 1/8 inch (internal diameter) PVC tubing can be used with the MX6
aspirator model; however, tubing length was limited for use with the S1000+. Tubing
naturally coiled and was weighted near the suspended end to maximize length and
eliminate recoil. Though only a small amount of weight was necessary to properly control
the tubing, longer segments substantially increased stress on the S1000+ because of the
moment created. Tubing was taped to the left landing gear leg and foot to prevent it from
being stripped from the aspirator in flight. The S1000+ self-corrected to the added external
force, but concern arose for potential damage to the landing gear. As a result, tubing was
reduced to a reasonable length of 9.33 feet. A 0.75 pound bag of metal weights was taped
firmly to the tubing about six inches from the suspended end with enough strength to hold
the bag, but not enough to compromise the integrity of the tubing. The gas monitor was
placed on the battery tray and secured using a small, 3D-printed mount with one screw.
The screw was inserted into the back of the MX6 where the belt clip is normally located.
Zip ties were included as an additional safeguard (see Figure 4.13).
Figure 4.6 shows the fully equipped S1000+ from the front. The gas monitor is located
below the collapsed, white antenna in the photo. The battery was repositioned on the tray
to counter-balance the 1.125 pound gas monitor, so that the center of gravity was located
at the center of the S1000+.
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Tubing Connections

iBrid MX6

Syringe Filter

GoPro Hero4

Figure 4.6: Fully Equipped S1000+ (Front View)
The PVC tubing is visible in the lower right of Figure 4.6. A Pall 0.45 µm acrodisk syringe
filter was installed at the end of the tubing. Industrial Scientific recommends this filter for
dust and moisture collection. A second filter is pre-installed at the aspirator/tubing
connection. Industrial Scientific states that a two-second delay in gas measurement is
present for every foot of tubing connected to the aspirator. Since 9.33 feet of tubing was
used, a delay of 19 seconds was assumed present in all samples.
The GoPro is positioned at an angle in Figure 4.6. The gimbal auto-leveled upon activation,
and the operator retained complete control over the vertical angle of the camera in flight.
Blasting was also documented from the ground, using a tripod-mounted HD video camera
and a handheld, high-resolution Nikon digital camera. Two people were needed to properly
document the blasts and operate the S1000+.
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4.3 Methodology, Flight A
Flight A occurred at Arch Coal’s Black Thunder Coal Mine near Wright, Wyoming. Prior
to Flight A, gas sampling had not been attempted; however, the S1000+ was previously
flown with the gas monitor and tubing installed. The observed blast encompassed two
benches. A total of 12 holes detonated 23,900 pounds of a 50/50 ANFO/emulsion blend in
the upper bench. A total of 99 holes in the lower bench shot 121,650 pounds of emulsion.
Figure 4.7 illustrates the outcome. The S1000+ is on approach in the image.

Figure 4.7: Flight A Blast-generated Cloud
It is evident from Figure 4.7 that the cloud on the upper bench shows signs of NOx (pale
yellow hue) while the cloud along the lower bench does not. The color difference between
the two clouds agrees with what researchers have discovered regarding the relative volume
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of NOx generated by a 50/50 blend versus pure emulsion (Figure 2.4). The upper cloud was
classified as fume level 1A. Figure 4.8 illustrates a plan view perspective of the flight.

Figure 4.8: Flight A Schematic
The S1000+ was operated from approximately 2,000 feet away, and the operator viewed
the flight directly from behind. At this distance, the operator was unable to determine if the
S1000+ intercepted the cloud. The coordinates provided by the video monitor were unable
to supplement the operator, since the distance to the shot was only an estimate.
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Additionally, the wind direction forced the clouds away from the operator. Upon evaluating
the results two days later, the data logger showed no measureable concentrations of NO,
NO2, or CO. It was determined that the operator had a clear understanding of the right and
left movement of the S1000+, while the forward and reverse directions were completely
indistinguishable. Proposed alterations to the sampling methodology are presented in
Chapter Nine.
Prior to takeoff, the control area was selected because of its reasonable view of the blast.
In addition, rain had saturated the area, and tire tracks in the mud eliminated most level
launch points. A safe perimeter from people and equipment (e.g. pickup trucks and light
plants) was established. The wind speed was a steady 13 miles per hour with gusts over 20
miles per hour. Weather approached mission abort conditions (see Table A1 in the
Appendix), but the flight was able to be completed safely near the time of the shot.
Preparation of the equipment was swift. Once the pre-flight checklist was completed, the
gas monitor was activated and a new data log was initiated using the menu on the MX6.
The S1000+ was launched six minutes before the blast.
The operator positioned the S1000+ about halfway between the observation area and the
lower bench blast. Consistent effort was required to assist the self-correction of the S1000+
in the midst of wind gusts. At detonation, the throttle was maximized to intercept and
pursue the emissions with haste. Figure 4.9 displays the operator’s reaction to the blast.
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Figure 4.9: Full Throttle Acceleration of S1000+
Bringing the S1000+ to a complete stop after achieving peak acceleration required
discretion. The suspended tubing tended to swing upward near the rotors. With an abrupt
stop, the tubing may have contacted the blades and impaired or eliminated flight capability
– potentially knocking the S1000+ out of the sky and destroying it. The S1000+ is capable
of flight with only seven of its eight rotors functioning, but this advertised feature was
never tested. The throttle was slowly reduced when nearing the desired hover point
downrange, allowing the tubing to sway in a relatively calm manner.
4.4 Methodology, Flight B
Flight B occurred at Arch Coal’s Coal Creek Mine (CCM), near Wright, Wyoming. A
moderately orange cloud was observed, which was classified as fume level 3B. The blast
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consumed 330,232 pounds of bulk blasting agent (both 50/50 and 40/60 ANFO/emulsion;
ANFO contained 4.167% fuel oil). A total of 328 holes were drilled, but only 267 holes
were loaded due to an underlying stream channel that created voids and weakened the local
rock mass. The overall powder factor was 0.32 lbs/BCY. Holes were wet, and the sleep
time of some loaded explosives was six weeks. Both the poor geologic conditions and
lengthy exposure of explosives to water likely exacerbated NOx formation. Tables A2, A4,
and A5, located in the Appendix, provide additional blast design and weather information.
Figure 4.10 shows the blast-generated cloud, which was a mixture of yellow and orange.

Figure 4.10: Flight B Blast-generated Cloud, 30 Seconds Post-blast
It was unanimously agreed among the observers that the blast shot well for the given
conditions. The blast was not designed to cast overburden. As a result, the muck remained
near its in situ position. Coloration of the air was not visible from the ground observation
area for 15 seconds, after which cloud formation was rapid.
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The cloud remained low to the ground along the bench; however, it quickly lifted in the
direction of the wind. Figure 4.10 displays NOx emissions 30 seconds following the blast.
The distinct orange color can be seen permeating from the crest of the bench. Figure 4.11
reveals the continuous secretion of NOx from the bench face nearly two minutes post-blast.
Coloration in the cloud faded from orange to yellow to pale yellow, dispersing completely
after about five minutes.

Figure 4.11: Flight B Bench Face Emissions
The operator and assistant improved the documentation of pre-flight procedures during
Flight B. Figure 4.12 shows the S1000+ and HD video camera at the launch point, which
was approximately 1,000 feet from the nearest row of holes in the blasting pattern.
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Figure 4.12: Flight B Launch Point
Figure 4.12 was photographed facing due south. The blasting pattern was 82 holes deep
into the image (2,132 feet) and four rows wide (184 feet). Wind was blowing at a consistent
11 miles per hour southeast. A flight area of 2,500 feet in all directions was free of
obstructions. The closest object was a dragline boom, which protruded above the spoil,
2,500 feet north of the launch point. Conditions were ideal for flying.
A safe perimeter from people, nearby pickup trucks, and the blaster’s truck was established.
The S1000+ was set up two hours before the flight and a thorough diagnostic check was
completed. It was discovered that one of the arms was loose at its connection with the
S1000+ frame, presumably from the combined abuse during shipment cross-country and
the heavy forces experienced during Flight A. The arm was repaired before takeoff.
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At the 10 minute blast warning, the gas monitor was powered on and a new data log was
started. Figure 4.13 shows the gas monitor attachment on the battery tray.

Figure 4.13: Flight B Gas Monitor Activation
The time on the gas monitor was announced while the HD video camera was recording, at
which point the time on the camera was also stated verbally. These times were later used
in conjunction with file creation times and common events in the photos/videos to correlate
cloud coloration with gas concentration data points.
Before the one minute warning, the S1000+ was energized by connecting the battery
terminals. Energization only activated the GPS – the rotors were not turning. Just after the
one minute warning, the rotors were activated and takeoff was initiated. Figure 4.14
displays the S1000+ hovering briefly above the launch point.
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Bag of Weights

Figure 4.14: S1000+ Hovering with Suspended Tubing
Figure 4.14 provides a useful perspective of the PVC tubing. The S1000+ can be seen
hovering with a slight leftward pitch as the tubing sways toward the right, illustrating the
effect of the weighted tubing with only minor movement. The bag of weights is visible
near the suspended end of the tubing. There was not excessive concern for flight failure
because of the tubing, since the rotors provided such a substantial amount of thrust. The
operator was proficient at protecting the S1000+, as well. Overall, the observation
presented in Figure 4.14 indicates that smaller sUAS may not be suitable for use with
suspended tubing.
At detonation, the S1000+ was airborne at approximately 500 feet from the closest row of
holes. The throttle was raised to its maximum position immediately. Limited hesitation was
required to avoid fly material, and the operator intercepted the cloud in seconds. Figures
4.15 and 4.16 illustrate the progression of the blast and the flight schematic, respectively.
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Figure 4.15: Flight B Blast Sequence

Figure 4.16: Flight B Schematic
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Figure 4.16 reveals the reduced proximity between the operator and the blast (compared to
Flight A). It was planned to intercept the cloud as it formed and then position the S1000+
at a stationary point downwind.
As previously mentioned, the S1000+ is capable of two flight modes: course lock and home
lock. With course lock active, the S1000+ flies along a rectangular grid, based on the
forward position at takeoff and regardless of its rotational orientation. Alternatively, home
lock forces the S1000+ to move about the launch (home) point, also regardless of its
orientation. Figures 4.17 and 4.18 illustrate the flight modes.

COURSE LOCK

STANDARD

Figure 4.17: Course Lock Flight Behavior (DJI Wiki, Intelligent Orientation Control)

STANDARD

HOME LOCK

Figure 4.18: Course Lock Flight Behavior (DJI Wiki, Intelligent Orientation Control)
The operator experimented with both modes during Flight B. Initially, the S1000+ was
placed in course lock, since the control area was oriented directly in line with the blasting
pattern and nearly perpendicular to the wind direction (i.e. a square flight pattern was
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expected to function efficiently). The use of course lock on takeoff provided excellent
control of the S1000+ at close range and at first contact with the blast-generated cloud.
After sampling the initial toxicity from the cloud, the operator attempted to track the cloud
using home lock. Home lock’s radial turning control allowed the operator to align the
S1000+ with the downwind direction and begin pursuing the cloud in a straight line.
Unfortunately, the operator suffered from depth perception issues, similar to Flight A. The
most valuable information was collected early near the bench. Downwind toxicities were
captured inadequately.
It was determined from the flight mode evaluation that course lock is most useful when the
operator is aligned perpendicular to the wind direction. In addition, course lock becomes
difficult to use at long distances, since movements of the S1000+ are directionally
indistinguishable. Home lock is advantageous downrange, since the operator can move
toward and away from the launch point with certainty.
Flight B was six minutes and fifty-five seconds in duration. The S1000+ was landed
manually approximately 10 feet from the launch point. The operator was cautious on
descent to prevent the tubing from catching the rotors near the ground. When the S1000+
was approximately five feet above the ground, the operator added thrust and nudged it in
the direction of the right landing gear, so that the tubing spread out gently. Figure 4.19
shows the S1000+ just after power down with the tubing at its side.
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Figure 4.19: Flight B Landing
Once landed, the gas monitor was powered off. A post-flight examination of the S1000+
showed no signs of stress, so the arms and antenna were collapsed. Results were evaluated
once the gas monitor was docked at a computer.
4.5 Sampling Results, Flight B
The blast-generated cloud was intercepted by the S1000+ three seconds after coloration
was observed from the control area, or 18 seconds after detonation. A sample of the cloud
was collected from the darkest orange region, displayed in Figure 4.10. Using file creation
times generated by the various devices, common events in the photos and videos, and the
time stamps provided by the gas monitor, the gas concentration measurements were
correlated with still frames extracted from the GoPro flight camera. Figures 4.20 and 4.21
therefore illustrate a relationship between cloud color and NOx concentration.
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Figure 4.20: Immediate NOx and CO Concentrations

Figure 4.21: GoPro Video Frame Sequence
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The sequence of images displayed in 4.21 was created using the flight camera. From 0:18
to 0:22, the S1000+ was accelerating into the cloud. Between 0:22 and 0:34, the S1000+
was stationary, hovering over the crest of the bench. After 0:34, the S1000+ was removed
from the cloud to identify the coloration of the measured sample (the PVC tubing was
suspended 7.6 feet below the landing gear; therefore, the sampled orange color is not
visible in images before 0:42).
The data presented in Figure 4.20 reveal the immediate impact on the local atmosphere.
The peak NO and NO2 measurements (257 ppm and 67.2 ppm, respectively) are believed
to be the ceiling concentrations representative of the observed blast. The decline in the
readings following 0:34 is caused by the movement of the S1000+ out of the cloud and in
opposition to the wind. Dissipation of the cloud is not a contributing factor. The portion of
the decline occurring before 0:34 is suspected to be the result of a wind gust undercutting
the PVC tubing inlet.
An estimate of the total volume of NOx produced by the blast was calculated from the
ranges presented in Figure 2.4. Approximately 149,791 kilograms (330,232 lb) of bulk
agent were detonated. A 50/50 blend was used to represent the outcome, since holes were
loaded with either a 50/50 or 40/60 ANFO/emulsion blend. A range of 5.0 L/kg to 31.0
L/kg yielded an estimated total NOx emission between 748,954 liters and 4,643,518 liters.
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Chapter Five: Additional Sampling
5.1 Overview
A third flight was conducted at a surface mine in the United States. The event is referred
to as Flight C. The circumstances of Flight C were different than the two flights previously
described. A summary is provided below:


A blast-generated cloud was observed from a distance of 15,000 feet. The cloud
was dark red to brown, indicative of very high NOx concentrations. The S1000+
was positioned directly downwind and launched to a ceiling of 400 feet. Gas
samples were collected, in order to evaluate detectable NO and NO2 concentrations.

Instrumentation used for sampling was unchanged, though this cloud was not documented
with the tripod-mounted HD video camera.
5.2 Methodology, Flight C
Figure 5.1 shows the immediate aftermath of the blast. The dark red and brown colors
indicate NOx concentrations in excess of the gas readings collected during Flight B.

Figure 5.1: Flight C Blast-generated Cloud
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The cloud was classified as fume level 5C, which is the most severe designation and
describes the worst-case local atmospheric impact. Though no data representative of the
colors shown in Figure 5.1 were collected, the cloud’s dispersion was closely monitored at
from a distance of approximately 15,000 feet. Figure 5.2 displays the flight schematic. The
blasting pattern dimensions and distance to the permit boundary are estimates.

Figure 5.2: Flight C Schematic

48

The wind direction transported the cloud directly toward the control area. As the cloud
passed directly overhead, the S1000+ was launched to 400 feet (the maximum ceiling
permitted by the FAA for the University of Kentucky’s sUAS research). Figure 5.3 shows
the coloration in the sky at launch.

Figure 5.3: Flight C Blast-generated Cloud Overhead
It was observed during flight that the visible yellow hue overhead, indicative of an NO2
concentration above 2.5 ppm, was higher than the 400 foot ceiling – though this was
speculation until the quantitative results were evaluated later. It was not possible to
determine where the visibly-toxic concentrations began and ended in the vertical direction.

49

5.3 Sampling Results, Flight C
The graph presented in Figure 5.4 illustrates NO2 readings measured between activation of
the S1000+ and its descent to the ground.

Figure 5.4: NO2 Measurements 15,000 Feet Downwind
Concentrations of NO2 up to 0.3 ppm were measured in the space between ground level
and 400 feet. A pungent scent was noticeable at the observation area, typical of blasting.
The odor threshold of NO2 is 0.12 ppm, though it is uncertain if NO2 was the cause. Other
gases not measured by the monitor may have also been present (e.g. ammonia). It was also
observed from the gas monitor data that NO and CO were absent from the local atmosphere.
Lack of NO suggests complete oxidation of the unstable gas to NO2. Since the yellow
coloration in the sky was observed above the flight ceiling (verified by NO2 measurements
consistently below 2.5 ppm), it is suspected that a substantial amount of the NO originally
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present inside the cloud was lifted by the wind (since NO is lighter than air) and later
oxidized to NO2. Overall, these results demonstrate that even the most severe NOx
emissions from surface blasting are capable of dissipating to minor concentrations at
ground level less than three miles from their origin, given the appropriate weather
conditions (Table A3). Cloud dispersion is discussed further in Chapter Six.
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Chapter Six: Blast-generated Cloud Dispersion
6.1 Overview
The instantaneous peak toxicity of blast-generated NOx must be considered in a broader
context before risk to human health and safety can be fully evaluated. Dispersion of blastgenerated clouds is an additional factor requiring evaluation. Dispersion is affected by an
assortment of variables. Wind speed, initial cloud toxicity, scale of the emission, and total
volume of NOx produced are generally considered to be the most important. The following
two sections review the cloud dispersion during Flights B and C, respectively.
6.2 Cloud Dispersion Results, Flight B
Originally, it was planned to position the S1000+ downwind of the blast in a stationary
location to monitor declining NOx concentrations over time; however, poor depth
perception at the lengthy operating distance hindered the ability to gather useful readings,
since the operator was constantly attempting to determine the position of the S1000+
relative to the cloud. The video monitor attached to the radio controller was not able to
supplement the operator, since the transmission was almost entirely diluted by distance. As
a result, intermittent gas concentration measurements from the periphery of the cloud were
collected. Figure 6.1 displays the readings captured after the initial 60 second postdetonation sampling window. An additional 355 seconds were logged before the gas
monitor was powered off (5.9 minutes), but no gases after registered above zero after 155
seconds (since the sUAS was removed from the cloud unintentionally and eventually
returned for landing); therefore, the horizontal axis in Figure 6.1 terminates at this time.
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Figure 6.1: Sampling Near Cloud Periphery in Downwind Direction
Figure 6.1 shows four distinct spikes in gas measurements, which resulted from slight
penetration of the S1000+ into the cloud. It is estimated that the dispersion data presented
in the graph were collected between 250 and 1,250 feet downwind from the blast origin.
The gas concentrations appear to follow an inverse relationship with time, but the results
do not provide a definitive dispersion rate, since the position of the S1000+ was not
constant. Future dispersion sampling should be conducted at stationary distance intervals.
While quantitative dispersion sampling was not immediately useful, behavior of the cloud
was monitored efficiently from the control area. Figure 6.2 illustrates the rapid dispersion
in a sequence of images, captured with a high-resolution digital camera. The camera zoom
and photo angle are not consistent, since the camera was held in hand. In addition, images
later in the sequence place more emphasis downwind.
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Figure 6.2: Flight B Dispersion Image Sequence
Figure 6.2 shows fading coloration as the gases and dust lift. The dark orange color
disappears in a matter of 30 seconds. After approximately five minutes, no visibly-toxic
concentrations of NO2 are present. A small amount of dust was aroused by the wind several
minutes after the blast but the air remained free of obvious NO2 presence.
A simple geometric dispersion model was developed, in order to calculate the unit volume
of NOx generated (i.e. per kilogram of explosive detonated) for comparison with previous
lab research (Figure 2.4). Physical observations were used to construct the model. For
example, the cloud generated by the blast at CCM lifted at 45 degrees in the direction of
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the wind (Figure 4.11). Additionally, coloration disappeared after about five minutes,
indicating an NO2 presence of at most 2.5 ppm. Relevant assumptions are listed below, and
an explanation of the mathematical procedure is provided following Figure 6.3.


Gases and air were mixed evenly throughout a right isosceles wedge



The distance of the wedge’s base was defined by the wind speed and the time until
all coloration disappeared (05:12, mm:ss)



The total volume of NOx produced was represented by a 50/50 blend of ANFO and
emulsion, as discussed in Section 4.5



All NO in the dispersion zone had fully oxidized into NO2 (thus, the volume range
of NOx produced is referred to as the volume of NO2)



The volume of the blast zone wedge was defined by the pattern dimensions (184
feet by 2,132 feet) and is included in the dispersion zone volume



The volume of NO2 in the blast zone was calculated using the peak toxicity of 67.2
ppm and was not the total volume released (see volume range in Figure 6.3)

Figure 6.3: Flight B Geometric Dispersion Model
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The blast zone is largely informational. It is formed using the pattern dimensions, cloud lift
angle (f), and peak concentration of NO2 measured. The volume of NO2 in the blast zone
is the instantaneous volume during the peak measurement – if that peak is evenly
distributed within the blast zone wedge; however, it does not represent the total volume of
NO2 emitted by the blast, since more of the gas permeates from the muck for a short time.
The larger dispersion zone wedge includes the blast zone and is the only feature of the
model that is necessary to calculate the unit volume of NOx generated. Its base is
constructed using the visible threshold of NO2. In other words, the variable D is the
maximum distance that the gases in the wedge can be carried by the wind by the time
coloration fades completely (NO2 ≈ 2.5 ppm). The wedge’s height is defined in the same
geometric manner as the blast zone, except the value of D is used instead of the selected
blasting pattern dimension, D1.
The volume range of NO2 within the dispersion zone is derived from previous lab research
and is used to validate whether or not the value of D is reasonable. Vlow and Vhigh are the
smallest and largest unit volumes of NOx produced by a particular explosive product,
measured in liters per kilogram (Figure 2.4). The variable Mexplosive is the mass in kilograms
of the blasting agent detonated. Assuming that all NO is oxidized to NO2 during the time
used to calculate D, the products of Vlow and Vhigh with Mexplosive provide a range of possible
NO2 volume (V1 – V2) within the dispersion zone wedge. The volume range can be
converted to a concentration range (C1 – C2) in parts per million, using ratios with the total
volume of the dispersion zone. If an NO2 concentration of 2.5 ppm falls within the
concentration range, then the value of D (thus the dispersion zone geometry) is acceptable.
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The unit volume of NOx is determined by the known NO2 concentration of 2.5 ppm and a
reorganized version of the ratio used to convert V1 and V2 to C1 and C2. The unit volume
can be described as NOx instead of NO2, because NO oxidizes to NO2 by a 1:1 molar
relationship (Equation 1, Section 2.3). Equation 2 below shows the method of unit volume
calculation.

𝑉𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡 =

2.5 𝑝𝑝𝑚 𝑁𝑂2
∗𝑉
1,000,000 𝑝𝑝𝑚 𝑤𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒

(2)

Figure 6.4 illustrates the results of the calculations presented in Figure 6.3. The same model
schematic is used.

Figure 6.4: Flight B Geometric Dispersion of NOx
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Calculations suggest that the NO2 concentration in the dispersion zone was 1.0 to 6.1 ppm.
Since the wedge volume was developed using the distance the cloud traveled until visible
NO2 disappeared (NO2 ≈ 2.5 ppm), the dispersion zone geometry is valid. Calculation of
the unit volume indicates that approximately 12.8 L/kg of NOx were generated for every
kilogram of 50/50 blend detonated.
Figure 6.5 is an updated version of Figure 2.4 that includes the estimated unit volume of
NOx generated by the blast at CCM (listed as “McCray, 2016” for a 50/50 blend).

Figure 6.5: Relevant Estimates of Blast-generated NOx Updated
The simple dispersion model is useful because it is derived from physical observations.
While a number of assumptions are necessary to develop the model completely, it can be
validated to some extent by lab data. Judgment of the cloud lift angle and instant when
coloration disappeared are subjective but can be overcome using a sensitivity analysis (i.e.
varying D and f to develop a range of unit volumes instead of a point estimate).
58

6.3 Cloud Dispersion Results, Flight C
A similar geometric modelling technique was applied to the Flight C measurements;
however, the calculations were carried out with a different purpose. Since no blast zone
measurements were recorded, the goal of the Flight C model was to back calculate an
estimate of the initial NO2 concentration using data collected downwind. The following
assumptions were applied to the model:


Nearly identical weather conditions on the Flight B and Flight C observation days
permitted the use of a right isosceles wedge, even though the true cloud lift angle
was not visible from the observation area



Gases and air were mixed evenly throughout the right isosceles wedge



The distance of the wedge’s base was defined by an approximate 15,000 foot
distance between the blast and the observation area



All NO in the dispersion zones had fully oxidized into NO2 (thus, the volume of
NOx produced is referred to as the volume of NO2)



The volume of the blast zone wedge was defined by estimated pattern dimensions,
since no shot report was obtained (200 feet by 2,500 feet)



The volume of NO2 in the blast zone was assumed to be the summation of both
dispersion zones (a value likely larger than reality)



The volume of NO2 in the ground level dispersion zone was calculated using an
evenly-distributed peak of 0.3 ppm measured below an altitude of 400 feet



The volume of NO2 in the above ground level dispersion zone was determined using
an evenly-distributed 2.5 ppm NO2 (since a pale yellow color was visible in the
sky) and does not include the volume of the ground level dispersion zone

Figure 6.6 demonstrates the mathematical procedure necessary to fully develop the model.
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Figure 6.6: Flight C Geometric Dispersion Model
Samples were collected at a known distance, D, from the blast origin, and below the flight
ceiling, H1. If it is assumed that the peak NO2 was evenly-distributed within the groundlevel dispersion zone, then a volume of NO2, V1, can be determined.
The above-ground-level dispersion zone is defined using the same distance, D, and the
cloud lift angle, f. The volume of the above-ground-level dispersion zone does not include
the volume of the ground-level dispersion zone. Coloration was observed above 400 feet;
therefore, an NO2 concentration of 2.5 ppm is assumed to be the average within the aboveground-level dispersion zone. Calculation of volume V2 provides an estimate of NO2 within
the above-ground-level dispersion zone.
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The summation of V1 and V2 is an estimate of the total NO2 generated by the blast. If this
total volume was present instantaneously within the blast zone (defined by the pattern
dimensions and cloud lift angle), then the peak concentration of NO2 present within the
initial blast-generated cloud, C3, can be calculated. Figure 6.7 shows the analysis outcomes.

Figure 6.7: Flight C Geometric Dispersion of NOx
The results presented in Figure 6.7 provide an estimate of 137.3 ppm NO2 in the blast zone.
The calculated value is larger than the 67.2 ppm peak measured during Flight B and is
therefore agreeable with the relative colors of the clouds. It is also more indicative of a
NO2 emission than total NOx, since the NOx concentration during Flight B peaked at 315.1
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ppm – much higher than 137.2 ppm. The shot report was not obtained for this blast but
would have greatly improved the informational value of this model, since a range of NOx
volume generated at the blast zone could then be calculated. In addition, the wedge
dimensions could be modified, based on the true blasting pattern dimensions.
While 137.2 ppm NO2 is a highly toxic concentration of the gas, the dispersion of the cloud
over a short distance provides useful evidence that even intense emissions of NOx from
surface mine blasting are only immediately concentrated for a small amount of time.
Dispersion in varying wind speeds should be evaluated to form a comprehensive
understanding of fume level 5C toxicity. In addition, the assumption that air is evenly mixed
is a challenging burden to overcome in this simple model. Realistically, NO2 is heavier
than air and is likely to reside lower in the dispersion zone; however, the measurement of
0.3 ppm below 400 feet with coloration in higher regions of the sky (i.e. > 2.5 ppm)
demonstrates the general lift of the cloud, given the appropriate weather conditions.
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Chapter Seven: Health Implications
7.1 Overview
It is understood that visible concentrations of NO2 are indicative of unhealthy atmospheres;
however, the human health and safety impact of surface mine blasting emissions requires
additional context. Risk to mine workers and the public is a function of initial cloud
toxicity, scale of blasting, and cloud dispersion behavior. Defining these factors
qualitatively does not adequately identify risk. Direct samples from the two large blasts
offer an initial, quantitative perspective of blast-generated NOx in a full-scale mining
environment, which heretofore has remained virtually absent from the body of scientific
knowledge. The sample size of this experiment is too small to form a comprehensive
conclusion, but the available data and observations show that there is little concern for
human exposure to hazardous levels of NO2 if the appropriate precautions are taken.
Studies cited by OSHA and NIOSH largely focus on exposure to minor concentrations of
NO2 for extended periods of time; however, abrupt exposures to elevated concentrations
of NO2 provide the most relevant comparisons to blast-generated NO2. For this reason, the
NIOSH IDLH value offers the best description of immediate health concern for mine
employees. Other existing standards, such as the OSHA ceiling PEL and EPA NAAQS,
are most applicable to the public, which may infrequently come into contact with a diluted
concentration of the emitted NO2.

63

7.2 Mine Employee Health
Instantaneous ceiling concentrations of NO and NO2 measured during Flight B were 2.57
and 3.36 times greater than the associated NIOSH IDLH values, respectively. These levels
were detected in the blast zone (i.e. in the immediate vicinity of the detonation).
Additionally, it is estimated that the ceiling concentration of NO2 within the Flight C blast
zone was 6.87 times greater than the IDLH. Although the initial NO and NO2 exceeded
life-threatening concentrations, the gases are not likely to cause harm in the normal course
of mining – if mines prone to regular and/or substantial emissions of NOx consider both
the sources of NOx and the previously discussed dispersion variables during the
development of blast(ing) area perimeters.
According to the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA), blasting area is defined
for surface coal mines to be “the area near blasting operations in which concussion or flying
material can reasonably be expected to cause injury” (30 CFR § 77.2, 1999). MSHA
defines a more comprehensive blast area for surface metal/non-metal mines as “the area
near the blasting operations in which concussion (shock wave), flying material, or gases
from an explosion may cause injury to persons.” The blaster in charge is responsible for
the development of a blast area and must consider the following factors to protect
individuals from such hazardous blasting outcomes (30 CFR § 56.2, 2004):


Geology or material to be blasted



Blast pattern



Burden, depth, diameter, and angle of the holes



Blasting experience of the mine



Delay system, powder factor, and pounds per delay



Type and amount of explosive material



Type and amount of stemming
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While establishing safeguards against blast-generated gases is mentioned in the definition
of blast area, this practice is not explicitly stated in the list of factors; however, it can be
inferred that mines with an emission history of NOx are responsible for developing a blast
area based on such previous experiences. For this reason, the causes of NOx – particularly
exposure of explosives to water and sleep time – should be considered during delineation
of blast area perimeters. In addition, the scale of the blast, wind speed, and wind direction
are also pertinent factors.
A common rule of thumb for the blast area perimeter is 1,000 feet from the nearest row of
holes in all directions. Individuals must not enter the area (and are prevented from doing
so) before the shot is fired and the blaster in charge approves of the outcome. The rule of
thumb is based on fly material, which is unlikely to be ejected with enough energy to travel
beyond a few hundred feet. While the preliminary NOx sampling and dispersion
observations presented in this document suggest that highly-toxic NOx concentrations are
short-lived, expanding the blast area perimeter to create a broader blast area exclusion zone
– with emphasis downwind – is in the best interest of mine employees.
Table 2.2 (pg. 12) provides an example of a blast area exclusion zone method. Downwind
distances were defined using dispersion modelling software, which considered initial
toxicity of NO2, several wind speeds, and a fixed emission volume. Similar tabulated tools
can be attuned on a site-by-site basis by (1) creating detailed, in-house case histories using
direct sUAS sampling or (2) drawing from a larger body of knowledge in the near future
once NO2 concentrations can be further attributed to explosive sleep time, scale of blasting,
and other relevant sources of the gas. In either case, seasonal weather differences at
individual mines will be paramount in forecasting the necessary exclusion zone.
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At this time, mines with regular NOx emissions are generally aware of the gases but may
not have strategies in place to provide provisional protection for workers. Until the health
risk is fully quantified by additional sampling studies, mines should (1) withdraw all
workers, without exception, to a position beyond the current rule of thumb definition of
blast area, (2) remove workers farther downwind from the blast area, based on the total
weight of explosives to be detonated and the sleep time of the explosives (i.e. experience
with previous NOx emissions), and (3) blast with elevated caution in low wind speeds.
Table 2.2 shows that slower air movement requires an extended exclusion zone; therefore,
wind speeds below about 5 miles per hour indicate that workers should be removed from
an extended downwind distance. It has been observed that mines in the United States often
observe the opposite behavior; they do not wish to blast during elevated wind conditions,
especially if the direction is not favorable (i.e. toward a nearby town). Greater wind speeds
are believed to improve dispersion and should be examined during future studies.
There are two additional NOx hazards that should be noted. The first is defined by weather
(wind speed and direction) and the second is avoidable with minimal effort.
1. NO2 is denser than air, and the gas may be retained in the pit below a bench blast.
For this reason, equipment operators and other mine personnel may come into
contact with the gas if natural ventilation is unable to effectively dilute it. These
individuals should take caution when returning to work, even after the blast is
cleared. In addition, those observing the blast from the pit should also be cautious
of rapid cloud formation. If the wind does not lift or remove the cloud, hazardous
levels of NO2 may be confined within the pit and propagate elsewhere.
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2. Equipment operators are not necessarily removed from the blast area and often
remain inside their machines within the 1,000 foot rule of thumb blast area
perimeter. Figure 4.7 shows two manned hydraulic shovels within this perimeter
after detonation of the blast during Flight A. The shovel beyond the white smoke is
positioned downwind. If operators remain near overburden blasts in this manner,
NO2 exposure may occur. Cab filters are not designed to eliminate toxic
components from the atmosphere, and cabs intended to recirculate clean air are not
perfectly insulated. As such, removal of operators from the area is prudent.
By introducing a more detailed delineation of blast area perimeters, it is likely that mine
workers will remain safe from even minor concentrations of NO2. Mines should begin
documenting NOx emissions, including photography of cloud formation and dispersion and
recording of weather data. Applying the proposed direct sampling method will advance the
development of blast area exclusion zones and solidify the necessary protective measures.
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7.3 Public Health
A prominent health concern is the transit of elevated NO2 levels outside of mine permit
boundaries. The Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) has designated 100 ppb (0.1
ppm) as the short-term national ambient air quality standard (NAAQS) for NO2. Both the
enormity and remoteness of most mining operations offer substantial protection for the
public (esp. mines in the Powder River Basin); however, it is possible for large clouds to
propagate for some distance. The cloud monitored during Flight C demonstrated arguably
the worst-case scenario for NOx emissions. Its characteristics are summarized below:


The cloud was designated as fume level 5C, indicating that the NO2 concentration
within the cloud was ranked as the most severe (estimated peak of 137.3 ppm).



The initial scale of the cloud was immense (estimated to be 2,500 feet across and
200 feet in height/depth).



The cloud crossed the permit boundary and was measured 15,000 feet away from
the blast origin (2.84 miles).



The gas monitor detected NO2 concentrations up to 0.3 ppm between the ground
and 400 feet, with visibly-toxic concentrations higher in the atmosphere.



The average NO2 concentration during the 158 second flight was 0.138 ppm.



An additional 10 seconds of data before takeoff showed an NO2 presence between
0.2 and 0.3 ppm. Including these values increases the average NO2 to 0.147 ppm.

The measurements taken downwind during Flight C are not directly attributable to the
hour-long NO2 average concentration, since the total sampling time was short; however, it
can be inferred that the risk of public exposure to harmful concentrations of NO2 was
minimal. It is unlikely over the passage of time that any larger concentration of NO2 would
have been observed, primarily because the measurements were taken at first contact with
the gases (i.e. the least amount of dispersion time was provided to the cloud). If the true
hour-long average concentration is regarded as either the measured average of 0.147 ppm
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or the measured peak of 0.3 ppm, then the applicable EPA AQI designation at 15,000 feet
from the blast was “unhealthy for sensitive groups” (Table 2.4). It is believed that that the
hour-long NO2 average was much lower than 0.147 ppm – even within compliance of the
NAAQS limit.
Flight C provides useful evidence that the most severe NOx emissions are capable of
dispersion to low ground-level concentrations over distances of at most 15,000 feet. It is
uncertain what concentrations were present between the mine permit boundary and the
control area, though no coloration was observed low in the sky due to consistent lifting of
the cloud. For these reasons, the preliminary sampling suggests that risk to public health
and safety is low.
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Chapter Eight: Challenges of Utilizing an sUAS for NOx Sampling
8.1 Complicated FAA Restrictions
The FAA finalized its rules for the registration and operation of sUAS in the national
airspace on June 21, 2016. Previously, acquiring the necessary documentation to fly for
commercial or research purposes (i.e. non-hobbyist activities) involved months, and
various restrictions were imposed on the applicant. Complying with some mandated
restrictions (such as the need for a licensed pilot) was challenging for many who were
seeking to take advantage of sUAS technology. The new rules have not been published for
a long enough duration to establish their challenges, but it is expected that the new
requirements (e.g. remote pilot certificate with a small UAS rating) will also be
complicated to obtain.
Prior to June 21, 2016, commercial sUAS operations required a Certificate of Waiver or
Authorization (COA) or Exemption to Section 333 to the FAA Modernization and Reform
Act of 2012 (FMRA). Completion of this project was possible through the University of
Kentucky (UK), which possessed a blanket area public agency COA for unmanned aerial
vehicle flight operations. General restrictions under the UKCOA and other similar FAA
approvals included the following:


Airspace ceiling limit (e.g. 400 feet AGL)



Daylight operations only



No operations within five miles of airports



Line of sight operation



Notice to airmen (NOTAM) filed with the FAA before each flight
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Specific safety procedures, such as protocol for lost link events and low battery conditions,
were also required to be clearly stated and understood.
The UKCOA also mandated the presence of two people during any flight event. These
individuals were to be medically approved to fly, and at least one was required to hold a
valid pilot’s license. The greatest challenge affecting the completion of this project was
coordination with a licensed pilot.
8.2 Weather Limitations
The application of an sUAS for gas monitoring is limited by weather conditions such as
rain and wind. Most sUAS devices capable of sustaining flight with the weight of the
suggested gas monitor attachment are large, and sensitive electronic components are often
exposed. As such, excessive water exposure may cause irreparable damage. Flying in rain
is also dangerous because it is possible that electronics will cease operation in flight and
cause the sUAS to fall uncontrollably the ground.
Most manufacturers rate sUAS devices for a specific, maximum wind speed. In some coalmining regions, the wind is comparably low with the Powder River Basin; however, data
collection with this method is currently most relevant to Powder River Basin blasting, due
to regularly-visible NOx emissions. Wind exceeding 20 miles per hour is likely to force
any sUAS to remain grounded.
8.3 Seasonal Impact on Gas Monitor Usage
Similar to weather concerns, seasonal temperature ranges will also affect the functionality
of both sUAS devices and gas monitors. Sampling during the winter months may not be
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possible. For example, the operating temperature ranges of the S1000+ and MX6 iBrid gas
monitor are 23˚F to 140˚F and -4˚F to 131˚F, respectively.
8.4 Gas Monitor Calibration and Upkeep
The MX6 iBrid and similar gas monitors require regular calibration intervals (e.g. once
monthly). There are two methods of calibration available (in most cases). First, the owner
can mail the monitor to the manufacturer and pay a fee. Second, the owner may choose to
purchase tanks of calibration gases and follow a series of specific steps to calibrate the
device manually.
It was elected to mail the MX6 iBrid prior to field sampling in this experiment, since three
separate tanks of calibration gas were required to complete the process. Two of the
necessary tanks were also not in stock for purchase. Calibration by mail is less convenient,
but purchased tanks must be stored properly and are difficult to transport. In addition, the
gaseous contents of the tanks degrade over time and are only useful for a maximum of
about two years.
Sensors within the gas monitors are additional components that require upkeep. Sensors
(such as those for NO and NO2) generally last for one to three years are relatively expensive
to replace. Replacement is not permitted by the average gas monitor user, either. The
selection of gas monitors capable of measuring NOx are considered life-saving devices. For
this reason, only the manufacturer and certain qualified personnel are permitted to service
the monitors.
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8.5 Drone Reliability/Maintenance
Most sUAS components are complex and sensitive. Careful inspections of the technology
must occur with regularity in order to preserve functionality. The S1000+ and similar
models are large and capable of causing serious damage to people and property. As a result,
detailed understanding about the mechanics, capabilities, and maintenance is necessary for
proper use. Maintenance may include exchanging rotors, troubleshooting electrical
systems using software, and testing various flight systems prior to operation. A serious
time commitment is therefore a requirement for sustaining the reliability of an sUAS.
8.6 Distraction for Mine Employees
Individuals are often fascinated by sUAS operations, particularly because of their unique
applications. As a result, sUAS devices may become a distraction from other important
tasks. Reducing awareness at mine sites has dangerous implications, especially for
equipment operators. Maintaining a business-as-usual attitude for those observing is
crucial, since a key advantage of the technology is safety. Jeopardizing safety in other areas
of the mining operation strips any value that the sUAS provides for gas monitoring.
8.7 Encouragement of Poor Decision-making
Although the application of an sUAS for gas monitoring offers large operating distances –
and therefore safety for operators – it is likely that some individuals will be encouraged to
approach blast sites for improved visibility. Challenges with depth perception at
observation distances of 1,000 feet or greater are certain. Though there are available
strategies to overcome these challenges (Section 9.1), poor judgment may increase risk of
injury or death from blasting outcomes.
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Historically, fly material ejected during detonation has caused many fatalities because of
poor communication and/or close human proximity to blasting (Bajpayee et al., 2003).
Operators approaching the bench may either not communicate their intentions or come too
close. Such behavior is detrimental to the liability of mining companies and security of
mine personnel that might choose to join the operator.
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Chapter Nine: Proposed Alterations to Methodology
9.1 Overcoming Depth Perception Issues
Depth perception was the single largest issue affecting sUAS-based gas sampling. At long
distances downrange, directional movements of the S1000+ became indistinguishable to
the operator (particularly forward and reverse). No data were collected during Flight A,
since the S1000+ did not intercept the blast-generated cloud. Similarly, dispersion
monitoring during Flight B was inhibited, because the S1000+ was unknowingly operated
only at the cloud periphery. It is expected that the addition of a spotter and a laser range
finder will overcome the negative influence of depth perception on future sampling.
Flights A, B, and C required a team of two individuals to complete. Ultimately, the team
concluded that the addition of a third individual would have improved results. Future
sampling will include a spotter, who will observe from a position perpendicular to the flight
path. Using a handheld radio, the spotter will provide information on the relative forward
and reverse movements of the aircraft. It is expected that sampling will receive the greatest
benefit from this change to the methodology, since positional suggestions can be
announced from an alternate perspective in real time during flight.
The addition of a laser range finder will also positively affect sampling but will require
additional planning by the operator prior to takeoff. Previously, the operating distance
relative to the blasting pattern was estimated. A laser range finder will be used in the future
to identify the downrange location of various landmarks (e.g. the highwall(s), equipment,
or light plants) relative to the control area. Positional information, provided by the
operator’s video monitor, will be compared with the measured distances during flight, to
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supplement visual limitations. Range finding will be added to the pre-flight checklist, and
the operator will need to apply his or her own judgment to capture the most useful
distances.
9.2 Improving Sampling
The samples analyzed by the gas monitor are believed to be accurate and representative of
the tested atmospheres; however, sampling can be improved by minor adjustments to the
tubing attachment and modifications to the S1000+ standard operating procedures (SOPs).
Currently, the sampling tubing’s inlet is suspended 7.60 feet below the landing gear to
avoid rotor downwash. It is suspected that the impact of downwash is still present, even at
this length. Doubling the tubing will further eliminate sample dilution. The added tubing
will also facilitate sampling near the crest of the muck, since the operator will not need to
position the S1000+ as closely. As a result, the chance of damage or destruction to
equipment will be reduced. Test flights with additional tubing first need to be conducted to
evaluate the impact of added tubing on flight characteristics of the S1000+, before
attempting this strategy in the field.
In addition to equipment adjustments, data analyses can be enhanced through amendments
to the S1000+ SOPs. User error was observed in the gas monitor data collected during
Flight C. Industrial Scientific recommends two seconds per foot of tubing. A total of 19
seconds were therefore required to completely clear the tubing attachment. The gas monitor
was deactivated shortly after landing and prior to the 19 second recommendation.
Consequently, the measured sample was not representative of the full descent from 400
feet (which ultimately did not negatively impact results in this experiment). In the future,
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the S1000+ operator must be aware of the sampling delay and should not deactivate the
gas monitor immediately after landing. The data logger should remain active for at least
the duration necessary to meet Industrial Scientific’s sampling timeframe.
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Chapter Ten: Conclusion
Sampling results reveal that the instantaneous peak concentration of NO2 in moderatelyorange, blast-generated clouds can be as high as 67.2 ppm – a value 3.36 times greater than
the NIOSH IDLH concentration of 20 ppm. It is estimated that, in extreme cases, the
instantaneous peak NO2 concentration can be as high as 137.3 ppm, which exceeds the
IDLH limit by 6.87 times.
Cloud dispersion observations show that it is possible for large, moderately-orange clouds
to dissipate in just over five minutes. Severe NOx emissions (dark red to brown/purple
clouds) require more time to disperse under similar weather conditions. Ground-level NO2
concentrations (0 to 400 feet vertically) were measured with an sUAS at 15,000 feet
downwind from a worst-case NOx emission. At this distance, NO2 peaked at 0.3 ppm and
averaged about 0.147 ppm over a short time period. The Environmental Protection Agency
requires that the one-hour average concentration of NO2 not exceed 0.1 ppm. It is believed
that the hour-long average was much lower than 0.1 ppm at 15,000 feet. The dispersion of
these two blasts indicates that moderate to severe NOx emissions are capable of dispersion
to relatively safe levels over short distances. As a result, mines that are remote or of
considerable scale naturally provide an efficient safeguard for the public; however, largescale blasting near mine permit boundaries may require special consideration for
uncontrolled structures or public roads that are within close proximity downwind.
Risk to the health and safety of both mine employees and the public is believed to be low,
based on the preliminary sampling and observations presented in this document; however,
it is prudent to quantify risk using blast area exclusion zones, which are an extension of
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the blast area, as it is defined by the Mine Safety and Health Administration. Determining
an exclusion zone requires a forecast of the expected intensity of the NOx emission, which
can be reasonably predicted once either (1) a case history of NOx emissions is developed
for an individual mine – including direct samples of gases, sleep time of explosives,
estimated water exposure of the bulk agent, scale of the blast, and weather conditions – or
(2) a broader body of knowledge regarding the relationship between of NOx and such
variables is developed. Mine employees will benefit most from the exclusion zone, due to
their generally closer proximity to the blast origin.
Geometric dispersion models developed during this experiment can be used to estimate the
unit volume of NOx (liters per kilogram of explosive) or predict the instantaneous peak
concentration of NO2 generated by a full-scale surface blast. The models are valuable
because of their simplicity and their attunement to real world events. They can be
constructed individually on a blast-by-blast basis and results can be validated using peerreviewed lab data. Future studies should consider adopting the proposed geometric
modelling method, or a similar technique that reduces the burden of computer modelling
while preserving a reasonable mathematical interpretation of emission characteristics.
In conclusion, the direct sampling method demonstrated in this document is suitable for
future research. It is capable of supplementing the current, qualitative assessment of NOx
and can be used to develop blast area exclusion zones for individual mines that generate
regular or substantial NOx emissions. The preliminary sampling data presented are new to
the body of scientific knowledge and provide a foundation for the quantitative evaluation
of blast-generated NOx. Additional measurements during diverse wind speeds and
temperatures are needed to form a comprehensive health and safety conclusion; however,
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the results of this study suggest that blast-generated clouds with visible concentrations of
NO2 are generally perceived as more dangerous than actuality. The Office of Surface
Mining Reclamation and Enforcement should consider sUAS technology as a means of
quantifying the toxicity and dispersion of blast-generated NOx, during its rulemaking
period. Although it is understood that visible concentrations of NO2 are hazardous, a
broader, quantitative context is required in order to fully define risk to human health and
safety in a mining environment.
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Appendix
Table A1: Flight A Weather Data
WEATHER VARIABLE
Temperature
Wind Speed
Wind Direction
Overall Conditions
Atmospheric Pressure
Humidity
Dew Point

VALUE UNITS
62
˚F
13*
mph
E
-Rain
-29.78
inHG
90%
-38
˚F

*Gusts up to 25 mph

Table A2: Flight B Weather Data
WEATHER VARIABLE
VALUE UNITS
Temperature
58
˚F
Wind Speed
11
mph
Wind Direction
SE
-Overall Conditions
P. Cloudy -Atmospheric Pressure
29.97
inHG
Humidity
50%
-Dew Point
39
˚F

Table A3: Flight C Weather Data
WEATHER VARIABLE
VALUE UNITS
Temperature
53
˚F
Wind Speed
8
mph
Wind Direction
SE
-Overall Conditions
P. Cloudy -Atmospheric Pressure
29.92
inHG
Humidity
65%
-Dew Point
43
˚F
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Table A4: Flight B Shot Details
SHOT REPORT INFORMATION
VALUE
UNITS
Total ANFO Weight
148,235
lbs
Total Emulsion Weight
181,997
lbs
Total Bulk Product Weight
330,232
lbs
ANFO Percentage
44.9%
-Emulsion Percentage
55.1%
-Total Explosives Weight
330,431.5
Listed Blend
50/50 or 60/40 -Ammonium Nitrate
142,306
lbs
Fuel Oil
5,929
lbs
Additives
None
-Shot Time
10:22 AM
-Detonator Type
Electronic
--

Table A5: Flight B Shot Design
SHOT DESIGN PARAMETERS VALUE UNITS
Burden
46
ft
Spacing
26
ft
Average Hole Depth
53
ft
Max Hole Depth
73
ft
Stemming Height
28
ft
Stemming Type
Cuttings
-Number of Holes Loaded
267
-Number of Holes Attempted
328
-Volume Shot
1,031,572 BCY
Lbs per Loaded Hole
1,237.6
lbs
Lbs per 8 ms
4,503.5
lbs
Powder Factor
0.32
lbs/BCY

Note that volume is calculated as 53 feet + 18 feet
(holes are held off of the coal by 18 feet).
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